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Abstract:  
 
During the last two decades, extraordinary legal developments have taken place at the regional and 
global level, as the world of international law has become inhabited by a growing number of 
organizations designed to govern phenomena cutting across state borders and affecting the life and 
wealth of individuals world-wide. This evolving reality has challenged traditional understandings of 
international law and increasingly scholars have resorted to the language of constitutionalism to 
describe the variety of regimes that by now exist beyond the states. The purpose of this essay is to 
discuss how comparative law can inform the discussion about the alleged constitutionalization of 
international law and provide insights to understand several features of the structure, functioning 
and finality of global governance institutions. In particular, the essay argues that a comparative 
analysis, grounded on historical studies, of experiences of federal governance offers a valuable 
perspective to analyse the phenomena of transnational governance and suggests that steps should be 
made to re-evaluate a long thread of legal practice and political thought that, from Althusius to the 
Federalist Papers, has offered original models and ideas to conceptualize constitutional regimes 
which were neither national nor international, but rather a mixture of both. Comparative federalism 
can today supply a rewarding framework to explain the developments occurring on a global scale. 
Indicating the path for future scholarly research in the field, the essay begins exploring the mysteries of 
global governance through the prism of federalism, identifies three recurrent features of transnational 
constitutional regimes - pluralism, subsidiarity and liberty - and underlines how these find 
correspondence in the experiments of federal governance of the past. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The last two decades have witnessed the rise of new forms of transnational cooperation 
among sovereign states, both at the regional level and on a global scale. The end of the Cold 
War and the unprecedented transformations which are generally described under the notion 
of globalization have created enormous pressures for governments to establish new, or 
expand existing, systems of governance beyond the states. A number of organizations with 
either a regional or a thematic focus (eg, security, trade, human rights or the environment) 
have blossomed world-wide: the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the 
World Trade Organizations (WTO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are some among more than hundreds 
of transnational regimes that today occupy an increasingly populated global legal space. 
These organizations are certainly not states. Yet, they have complex institutional systems, 
they exercise a broad array of governmental powers and they directly affect the life and 
wealth of millions of individuals. As such, this evolving reality has challenged traditional 
understandings of international law and increasingly scholars have resorted to the language 
of constitutionalism to describe the variety of regimes that by now exist at the transnational 
scale.  
 
The purpose of this essay is to discuss how a comparative, historical perspective can inform 
the discussion about the alleged constitutionalization of international law and provide 
original insights to understand several features of the structure, functioning and finality of 
governance regimes at the regional and global level. In particular, the essay argues that a 
comparative analysis, grounded on historical studies, of experiences of federal governance 
can enrich our understanding of the dynamics currently taking place in the transnational 
setting and qualify the claim that the constitutionalization of international law constitutes 
an entirely new and unprecedented development. To this end, the essay points to the 
advantage of re-evaluating a long thread of legal practice and political thought that, from 
Althusius to the Federalist Papers, has offered original models and ideas to conceptualize 
constitutional regimes which were neither national nor international, but rather a mixture 
of both, and maintains that comparative federalism can today perhaps supply a rewarding 
prism through which to look at the developments occurring on a transnational scale. 
 
This essay overviews the rise of constitutional regimes beyond the states and introduces a 
discussion on the potentials of federalism to make sense of this new legal reality, with the 
aim to sketch the outline of a more comprehensive research agenda. By analyzing the 
emergence of forms of constitutional ordering at the transnational level through the prism 
of the practice and theory of federalism, the essay seeks to flag some recurrent features of 
the structure, functioning and finality of regional and global governance institutions. The 
essay argues that pluralism, subsidiarity and the purpose to enhance liberty are 
characteristics of most contemporary constitutional regimes beyond the states and 
emphasizes how these correspond, at the same time, to constitutive features of federal 
arrangements of the past. The essay is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the rise 
of governance regimes beyond the states. Section 3 overviews the scholarly literature on the 
constitutionalization of international law. Section 4 re-conceptualizes the transformations 
occurring on the regional and global arena in light of federalism and Section 5 discusses 
how this approach can help to identify several recurrent features of transnational 
constitutional regimes, hence outlining possible new avenues for research. By combining 
the analysis of new forms of international law with the insights of comparative law, the 
essay seeks to contribute to improve our understanding of systems of global governance in 
which sovereignty is ever more fragmented and evanescent. 
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2. THE RISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL 
 
During the last two decades, extraordinary legal developments have taken place on the 
global scale. Since the end of the Cold War, the world of international law has become 
inhabited by a growing number of organizations designed to govern and manage 
phenomena that cut across state borders and affect the life and wealth of individuals world-
wide.1 These organizations range in geographical scope, from regional bodies to institutions 
grouping the (quasi) totality of states world-wide. They have varying thematic focuses, 
from functional regimes, focused specifically on eg the protection of human rights, the 
enhancement of trade, or the conservation of the environment, to entities which enjoy broad 
governmental powers and pursue multiple objectives. They have more or less sophisticated 
decision-making structures, from simple regulatory bodies to complex machineries for law-
making and adjudication. And they differently combine public and private elements, 
reflecting the interests of a plurality of stakeholders.  
 
Despite their differences, however, all these global governance institutions present several 
common characteristics. First, they are subject to a high degree of legalization, exercising a 
broad array of powers through law.2 Second, they take legal decisions that directly affect 
not only states, but also individuals or private entities.3 Third, they entertain with states a 
complex relation, which defies conventional understandings of international law based on 
state consent.4 States certainly play a crucial role in the establishment of these 
organizations, mainly resorting to traditional instruments of international law such as 
treaties. Nevertheless, once they are created, these institutions start living a life of their 
own, which operates to various degrees outside state control.5 ‘International law has 
expanded its scope, loosened its link to state consent and strengthened compulsory 
adjudication and enforcement mechanisms.’6 As a growing literature has underlined, 
globalization has profoundly changed the nature of public authority, by reducing the 
centrality of the state and creating sites of authority beyond it, below it, as well as besides it 
(in the realm of private regulation and enforcement).7  
 
A prime example of these phenomena is the EU. In the context of regional integration in 
Europe, in fact, the EU experienced a progressive development from a (mainly) Economic 
Community (EEC) into a Union now endowed even with a shared citizenship, a single 
currency and a Charter of Rights. The EU member states have directly enlarged the 
constitutional mandate of the EU through subsequent amendments to the founding treaties. 
At the same time, a key contribution to the development of the EU has been provided by the 
internal actions of the EU institutions themselves. While the role of the EU Court of Justice 
                                                 
1 See eg Joel Trachtman, The Future of International Law: Global Government (CUP 2013) 1 (defining 
‘international government [a]s nothing more than an intensification of international law.’) and Charlotte Ku, 
International Law, International Relations and Global Governance (Routledge 2012). 
2 See Kenneth Abbot et al, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 Intl Organization 401 (defining as highly 
legalized institutions those in which rules are obligatory on parties, are precise and in which authority to 
interpret and apply these rules has been delegated to third parties acting under the constraint of rules).  
3 See Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, ‘An International Constitutional Moment’ (2002) 43 
Harvard Intl L J 1, 13 (speaking about the ‘individualization of international law’). 
4 See Louis Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”’ (1996) 25 Georgia J Intl & Comparative L 31, 33 
(emphasizing how international law, especially in the areas of human rights, now includes important norms to 
which some states have not consented).  
5 Gordon Silverstein, ‘Globalization and the Rule of Law: “A Machine that Runs of Itself?”’ (2003)1 I-Con 427.  
6 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 
EJIL 907. 
7 See Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and 
Private Power’ (2012) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 117; Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A 
Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (CUP 2012). 
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(ECJ) in fashioning a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe has 
been famously emphasized,8 also the EU political branches – the Commission, the 
Parliament and even the Council, in which the states are represented – have been crucial in 
expanding the powers of the EU into new policy areas and strengthening the position of 
natural and legal persons as direct recipients of EU goods and values. 
  
Nevertheless, the developments that have taken place in the EU are in no way sui generis. At 
the global scale, the UN has emerged as the most important institutions in the management 
of security challenges world-wide, heavily increasing its involvement in activities of peace-
making and peace-keeping. In the context of the fight against terrorism, in particular, the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) has acquired sweeping powers to prevent threats to 
international security, by directly targeting individuals and entities suspected of financing 
terrorism and requiring the states world-wide to freeze their funds.9 While the confusion of 
executive, legislative and judicial powers in the hand of the UNSC has been recently at the 
center of major criticism10 – as well as of forms of judicial resistance by some domestic 
courts11 – the recent expansion of the sphere of action of the UNSC attests to the evolution 
that has taken place under the framework of the UN Charter.  
 
In addition, similar developments have been witnessed in sector-specific areas such as 
human rights. In this field, a plurality of transnational institutions specifically charged to 
adjudicate human rights’ claims have blossomed around the world, significantly 
strengthening the mechanisms of external supervisions over the human right practice of 
states. Hence, in the European continent, the ECHR has been recently amended to give the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) mandatory jurisdiction to hear, after the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies of recourse, individual applications against any authority of 
the 47 contracting parties to the ECHR which has allegedly violated a right protected 
under the ECHR.12 The ECtHR moreover can condemn a state, compel it to pay damages 
and require it to redress systematic violations of the ECHR by amending its internal 
legislation when this is held incompatible with the ECHR. Albeit with different powers, 
similar regimes of human rights protection currently exist also in America and Africa,13 and 
have been under discussion in Asia as well as on a world scale.14 
 
Functional organizations have also flourished in the field of economic governance, both at 
the transnational and regional level.15 While the WTO – which overhauled the Global 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) – operates as the main platform to manage and 
enforce free trade across a large chunk of the world population, specific institutions aimed at 
integrating regional markets have been established in North America (Nafta) South 
America (Mercosur and the Andean Community), West Africa (Ecowas), the Asia-Pacific 
                                                 
8 Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 AJIL 1. 
9 Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the UN Security Council (Hart 2004). 
10 See eg Enzo Canizzaro, ‘The Machiavellian Moment? The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law’ (2006) 
3 Intl Organizations L Rev 89. 
11 See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. EU Council and 
Commission [2008] ECR I-6351 (striking down a EU regulation implementing UN sanctions on due process 
grounds). 
12 See eg Hellen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights (OUP 2008). 
13 See eg Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (CUP 2010).  
14 See eg Tae-Ung Baik, Emerging Regional Human Rights Systems in Asia (CUP 2012) and Martin Scheinin, 
‘Towards a World Court of Human Rights’, research report within the framework of the Swiss initiative to 
commemorate the 60th anniversary of the UDHR (2009). 
15 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘International Economic Law, “Public Reason” and Multilevel Governance of 
Interdependent Public Goods’ (2011) 14 J Intl Economic L 23.  
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(Apec) and the Caribbean (Caricom). But this list is by no means complete.16 An intricate 
web of transnational organizations – usually known by their acronyms – today regulates 
policies as varied as collective-defense (Nato), finance (IMF, World Bank and the Basel 
Committee), health (WHO), food (Codex Alimentarius Commission), labor (ILO), sport 
(WADA) or the protection of cultural heritage (Unesco) – not to mention, of course, the 
creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) empowered to prosecute war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity (almost) everywhere in the world.17  
 
The impressive developments that have recently taken place at the global level have called 
into question traditional conceptions of the nature of law premised on the theory of 
sovereignty.18 Under the Westphalian paradigm which emerged in Europe with the 
formation of territorial states in the 17th century, and was spread by Europe around the 
world in the ensuing centuries, two separated body of laws governed action by states – 
constitutional law, regulating the exercise of public power within sovereigns; and 
international law, prescribing rules of conduct among sovereigns.19 The sovereignty-based 
strict separation between municipal constitutional law and international public law, 
however, has been increasingly challenged by the emergence of a body of transnational law, 
blurring the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.20 As it has been argued, the 
rise of mechanisms of authority and sources of law in the context of global governance 
eroded ‘the classical separation model for dealing with international affairs […which] 
involved a fairly strict separation between the domestic and the international.’21 Although 
instruments of international law, such as treaties, are still heavily employed in the context 
of global governance, the blurring of boundaries between internal and external law, and the 
capacity of supranational institutions to directly affect through law the actions of 
individuals and firms bypassing state intermediation have challenged the continuing 
validity of the notion of sovereignty,22 and called for a profound rethinking of the boundary 
between national constitutional law and international public law.23  
 
3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
                                                 
16 For a comprehensive taxonomy of institutions operating at the global level, including entities which are 
more administrative/regulatory than constitutional, see Sabino Cassese, The Global Polity (Global Law Press 
2012).  
17 William Schabas, ‘The International Criminal Court at a Crossroads’, in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing 
Utopia (OUP 2012). 
18 For the paradigmatic elaboration of the theory of sovereignty at the dawn of the modern age see of course, 
Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de La Républiques (1576). For a contemporary analysis see Michel Troper, ‘The 
Survival of Sovereignty’ in Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds), Sovereignty in Fragments – The Past, Present 
and Future of a Contested Concept (CUP 2010) 132. 
19 See Wilhelm Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (De Gruyter 2000) and Neil MacCormick, Questioning 
Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (OUP 1999). 
20 Rafael Domingo, The New Global Law (CUP 2011). 
21 Nico Krisch, ‘Global Governance as Public Authority: an Introduction’ (2012)10 I-Con 976, 977-978. 
22 For a criticism of the viability of the legal concept of sovereignty today see Sabino Cassese, ‘L’erosione dello 
Stato: Una vicenda irreversibile?’ in Sabino Cassese, La Crisi dello Stato (Laterza 2002) 44. For a more popular 
perspective see then Philip Stephens, ‘Nations Are Chasing the Illusion of Sovereignty’ Financial Times (6 June 
2013). 
23 This point has been emphasized both from the perspective of constitutional law and from that of 
international law. Compare Ernst Young, ‘The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism’ (2003) Texas Intl L J 
527, 545 (noticing, albeit grudgingly, that it ‘is just increasingly unrealistic to study constitutional structure 
without including supranational institutions and constitutional rights without including the corpus of 
international law’) and Trachtman (n1), 18 (arguing that ‘the central crisis in international law’ is due to the 
multiplying of the exceptions to the Westphalian paradigm). 
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In response to these profound transformations, legal scholarship has advanced a number of 
perspectives to re-conceptualize the developments occurring beyond the states.24 These 
perspectives range in scope, taking inspiration from alternative conceptual legal traditions 
and combining in different ways empirical and normative claims about the Sein and the 
Sollen of global governance. Drawing upon the resources of domestic administrative law, for 
instance, the ‘global administrative law’25 project has examined the phenomena of global 
regulatory governance mainly from an empirical perspective, albeit attentive to normative 
principles of due process and accountability.26 The project on ‘public authority in 
international institutions’, instead, has sought to construct from a normative viewpoint a 
doctrinal edifice on the exercise of public authority at the international level by exporting 
principles existing in the national context.27 An increasingly important perspective on the 
transformation taking place at the transnational scale, finally, is represented by the 
scholarship on the constitutionalization of international law. As much as ‘constitutionalism 
has become the dominant currency of the debates on European integration,’28 scholars have 
increasingly resorted to the idea of constitutionalism also to make sense of the changes 
taking place in global governance.29 
 
The scholarship on the constitutionalization of international law is quite diversified. To 
begin with, as Vicki Jackson explained, this scholarship pursues at least two separate 
research projects:30 On the one hand, it examines whether, within the field of international 
law, some norms are becoming constitutional in character vis-à-vis other norms of 
international law; On the other hand, it considers whether transnational or supranational 
law, or portions of it, is being constitutionalized vis-à-vis domestic law. A leading example 
of the first perspective is offered by Joel Trachtman’s analysis of how forms of enabling, 
constraining and supplemental constitutionalization have emerged in the international area 
in order to respond to the increasing demand for legalization.31 The second perspective, 
instead, is at the center of the manifold analysis that have stressed the growing centrality 
and the pervasive impact of law generated beyond the states in the legislative, judicial and 
administrative practices of the states.32  
 
Secondly, the literature on the constitutionalization of international law includes 
scholarship which is analytical in nature, and scholarship which, on the contrary, explicitly 
embraces a normative perspective. Hence, while several studies have empirically underlined 
                                                 
24 See eg Neil Walker, ‘Intimations of Global Law’, Montesquieu Lecture delivered at Tilburg Law School, 21 
June 2012. 
25 See eg Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard Stuart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ 
(2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15. 
26 See Sabino Cassese, ‘A Global Due Process of Law?’, in Gordon Anthony et al (eds), Values in Global 
Administrative Law (Hart 2011) 17; and Giacinto della Cananea, Al di là dei confine statuali: Principi generali del 
diritto pubblico globale (Il Mulino 2009). 
27 See eg Armin von Bogdandy et al (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing 
International Institutional Law (Springer 2010). 
28 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘How Constitutional Can the European Union Be? The Tension Between 
Intergovernmentalism and Constitutionalism in the European Union’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
5/2004, 3. 
29 See eg Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 
2009); Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in 
Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law and Global 
Governance (CUP 2009) 3.  
30 Vicki Jackson, ‘Paradigms of Public Law: Transnational Constitutional Values and Democratic Challenges’ 
(2010) 8 I-Con 517, 519. 
31 Trachtman (n 1) 253. 
32 See eg Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights and International Constitutionalism’ in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel 
Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 233. 
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how ideas of constitutionality can be helpful to explain international governance 
frameworks as they exist de lege lata,33 a large component of the literature on global 
constitutionalism adopts an aspirational approach, aimed at promoting de jure condendo the 
values of constitutionalism at the transnational scale.34 From this point of view the 
constitutionalization of international law is pursued as a way to tame the fragmentation of 
international law;35 or alternatively as a tool to compensate for the diminishing importance 
of constitutionalism at the domestic level.36 In this case, as it has been argued, the idea of 
‘global constitutionalism grapples with the consequences of globalization as a process that 
transgresses and perforates national or state borders, undermining familiar roots of 
legitimacy and calling for new forms of checks and balances as a result.’37  
 
Thirdly, scholars employ the language of constitutionalism to make sense of the new reality 
of transnational governance at different levels of scale. Erika de Wet, for instance, has 
argued the case for an emerging international constitutional order, consisting of a society, a 
value system and structures of enforcement.38 Other scholars, on the contrary, have applied 
constitutional concepts to specific international regimes, rather than to the global order as 
such. The outburst of the constitutionalist idea is obviously paramount in the European 
setting. Here, for several decades now, lawyers have conceptualized in constitutional terms 
the developments occurring beyond the states, in the architecture of the EU.39 And, despite 
the failure of the project of Constitutional Treaty, the case law of the ECJ has continued to 
provide support for this reading.40 At the same time, also the ECHR has been more and 
more the object of constitutionalist interpretations, aimed at emphasizing the features of the 
ECtHR as a constitutional court.41 Yet, the discourse of international constitutionalism has 
not stopped at Europe’s edges. In the late 1990s, Bardo Fassbander famously characterized 
the UN Charter as the Constitution of the international community,42 and recent events 
have contributed in strengthening this understanding.43 At the same time, constitutional 
language is frequently employed in relation to global entities operating in the field of trade 
or the environment.44  
 
                                                 
33 See eg Julian Arato, ‘Constitutionality and Constitutionalism Beyond the State: Two Perspectives on the 
Material Constitution of the United Nations’ (2012) I-Con 627. 
34 See eg Nicholas Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (CUP 
2007). 
35 See eg Lucas Lixinski, ‘Taming the Fragmentation Monster through Human Rights? International 
Constitutionalism, “Pluralism Lite” and the Common Territory of the Two European Legal Orders’ in Vicky 
Costa et al (eds), The EU Accession to the ECHR (Hart Publishing 2014). 
36 See eg Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: the Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 Leiden J Intl L 579.  
37 Antje Wiener et al., ‘Editorial: Global Constitutionalism, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ 
(2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 1, 6. 
38 See eg Erika de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 51.  
39 See eg Joseph HH Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (CUP 1999) and Paul Craig, ‘Constitutions, 
Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2001) ELJ 125. 
40 See eg Leonard Besslink, A Composite European Constitution (Europa Law Publishing 2007) and Stefan 
Griller, ‘Is this a Constitution? Remarks on a Contested Concept’ in Stefan Griller and Jacques Ziller (eds), 
The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008), 21.  
41 See eg Steven Greer and Luzius Wildhaber, ‘Revisiting the Debate about “Constitutonalising” the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2012)12 Human Rights L Rev 655.  
42 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The UN Charter as the Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 36 
Columbia J Transnational L 529.  
43 See Bardo Fassbender, ‘Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution: Notes on the Place of the UN Charter in 
the International Legal Order’ in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, 
International Law and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 133. 
44 See eg Joel Trachtman, ‘The Constitutions of the WTO’ (2006) 17 EJIL 623 and Daniel Bodansky, ‘Is there 
and International Environmental Constitution?’ (2008) 16 Indiana J Global L Studies 565. 
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Needless to say, the idea that constitutionalism should be the lens through which to analyze 
global governance meets several criticisms. At one end of the spectrum, scholars anchored 
in the theory of sovereignty have rejected the idea that constitutionalism and the state can 
be disarticulated and strongly reaffirmed the centrality of sovereignty as the basis for 
constitutional government.45 Drawing on a bicentennial tradition that conceived of state, 
people and constitution as the three elements of a magic triangle, those positions have 
rejected the view that constitutionalism could exist in supranational or transnational 
settings and, at the same time, sought to limit the impact of these changes.46 However, the 
discourse about global constitutionalism has also been under attack by scholars at the 
opposite end of the spectrum. Others, in fact, have denied the claim that constitutionalism 
and global governance can be reconciled, and described the pluralism of global law as an 
entirely new feature of post-national contemporary legal reality.47 From this perspective, 
therefore, the developments occurring beyond the state constitute a fundamental departure 
in the organization of public authority from constitutionalism toward pluralism – with the 
conclusion that the idea of constitutionalism should be put to rest.48 
 
Yet, the arguments challenging the constitutionalization of international law have been 
resisted with strong counter-arguments.49 In particular, a very articulate defense of 
constitutionalism beyond the state has been offered by Mattias Kumm.50 In Kumm’s view, 
the skepticism against the application of constitutional language to international law is the 
product of a statist paradigm of thought, which conceives of constitutionalism exclusively 
through the vocabulary of sovereignty.51 To counter this view, Kumm proposed ‘a 
revolution in legal thinking’52 with the introduction of a new paradigm of constitutional 
thought – what he called a ‘cosmopolitan paradigm of constitutionalism.’53 Whereas 
national scholarship has ‘inappropriately narrowed, morally misconstrued, and falsely 
aggrandized national constitutionalism by analytically connecting it to a statist paradigm of 
law,’54 Kumm encourages scholars to free constitutionalism from the confines of 
sovereigntist thinking and to re-conceptualize it in cosmopolitan terms as a new ‘framework 
for a general theory of public law that integrates national and international law.’55 
Reconceived in this manner, constitutionalism provides an accurate account of the 
structural features of contemporary legal and political practice and can be meaningfully 
employed to explain the transformations occurring on a global scale.56 
                                                 
45 See eg Jeremy Rabkin, Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States 
(Princeton University Press 2005). 
46 See eg in the context of the debate about EU constitutionalism Paul Kirchhof, ‘Der Deutsche Staat im 
Prozeß der Europäischen Integration’ in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland VII (Müller Verlag 1992), 855. 
47 See eg Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 2010). 
48 See eg in the context of the debate about EU constitutionalism Matej Avbelj, ‘Questioning EU 
Constitutionalisms’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1.  
49 See also Daniel Halberstam, ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union 
and the United States’ in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, 
International Law and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 326 (explaining that pluralism is not an alternative to 
constitutionalism, but rather a component of it, in those systems characterized by structural or institutional 
heterarchy). 
50 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State’ in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (CUP 2009), 258. 
51 ibid, 260. 
52 ibid, 261. 
53 ibid, 263. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid, 264 (emphasis omitted). 
56 ibid, 266. 
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This essay joins the debate about the constitutionalization of international law by 
contextualizing the transformations currently taking place at the transnational level in a 
broader historical and comparative context. In particular, the essay purports to qualify the 
statement that the conceptual integration of constitutional law and international law 
requires a ‘Copernican turn’ in legal thinking.57 If at the dawn of the 21st century, 
constitutionalism is on the verge of leaving the safe port of the nation-state to navigate the 
transnational seas of global governance, this essay asks whether this represents an 
unprecedented conceptual change in the organization of political authority. As I shall try to 
argue, the challenges we are currently experiencing in the context of transnational 
governance are not entirely new, having been at the heart of the theory and practice of 
federalism for many centuries before, and after, the rise of the nation states. Seen from this 
broader historical and comparative perspective, the contemporary debate about the 
constitutionalization of international law appears as much a ‘Copernican turn’ as a return to 
Aristarchus after a few centuries of Ptolemaic doctrine.   
 
4. A REVIVAL OF FEDERALISM? 
 
This essay claims that a comparative, historical perspective can contribute to the debate 
about the alleged constitutionalization of international law by suggesting that the 
transformations currently taking place in the transnational arena constitute a revival of 
federal ideas. In particular, the argument of this essay is that the rise of global 
constitutional regimes can be re-conceptualized through the prism of federalism. As a 
leading contemporary scholar of federalism has explained, the idea of federalism, much like 
that of democracy or republicanism, is part of the classical terminology of political 
philosophy, and as such escapes clear-cut definitions.58 By federalism, however, I mean here 
a constitutional theory and a model of institutional design for the governance of a 
compound system which is not a state, but rather a union of states. More specifically, for the 
purpose of my argument federalism should be understood as a constitutional regime that is 
created by sovereign states acting through a legal instrument of contractual nature (be it a 
treaty or a constitution) and that is endowed with an heterarchical system of governance in 
which the autonomy and continuous existence of the constituting entities is secured and yet 
combined with the authority and governmental capacity of the constituted union.  
 
Albeit imperfectly, this definition seeks to merge the most distinctive features of federalism 
as they have been unveiled by the rich scholarship in the field.59 First, it reflects the idea of 
federalism as ‘a system of law and structure of power.’60 Second, it emphasizes federalism’s 
ability to combine ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared-rule’, the promotion of diversity together with the 
protection of a meaningful form of unity.61 Third, it clarifies the nature of federalism as a 
‘half-way house between interstate and intrastate relations,’62 underlining how, on the one 
hand, states remain autonomous entities within the federal union (without dissolving 
themselves within it) and, on the other, the union itself is endowed with an authority and 
capacity to act (potentially directly vis-à-vis the citizens of the states) akin to that possessed 
                                                 
57 ibid, 263. 
58 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Alabama University Press 1987) 15 
59 On federalism see also Olivier Beaud, Théorie de la Fédération (Presses Universitaires de France 2007). For a 
comparative analysis of federal systems world-wide see instead Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 
1990s (Queen’s University 1996). 
60 Samuel Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (Harvard University Press 1993) 23. 
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by the states themselves. Fourth, it stresses the crucial role of law in creating the federal 
regime as a voluntary process of coming together of pre-existing states,63 and 
simultaneously underplays the distinction between constitutional law and international law 
as the source for the creation of the union.64 With this conceptual tailoring, I am convinced 
that federalism can provide an important contribution to the analysis of contemporary 
forms of constitutional regimes at the transnational level.  
 
The usefulness of resorting to the federal idea to appraise the changes brought about by 
globalization has already been emphasized by political scientists and political theorists. As 
the late Daniel Elazar argued, ‘much if not most of what is happening to bring about th[e] 
constitutionalization [of international law] is what classically has been known as 
federalism.’65 And as Jean Cohen has recently explained, federalism ‘may provide the 
missing concept needed to theorize a mode of political integration (via extension) that is 
normatively attractive and analytically necessary to make the discourse of the 
constitutionalization of international law and regional or global ‘governance institutions’ 
meaningful.’66 Nevertheless, the revival of federalism has not made its way, yet, in the field 
of public law. Despite the invitation to reconsider the divide between constitutional law and 
international law in light of the comparable problems (of uncertainty, enforcement and 
sovereignty) that these two bodies of public law face,67 the rise of transnational 
constitutionalism has not resulted in a re-consideration of the experience of federalism as a 
possible conceptual benchmark to explain contemporary reality. 
 
The neglect of federalist thinking in the analysis of the constitutionalization of international 
law is largely due to the progressive assimilation between federalism and the federal state that 
has occurred in Western legal thought over the last two centuries.68 Since the 19th century, 
in fact, public lawyers (especially in Europe) have come to consider federalism simply as a 
theory for the political organization of a sovereign state and as a technical devise to 
decentralize competences within a single, hierarchical constitutional system. This statist 
bias has significantly reduced the scope of application of the federal idea, by equating 
federalism to a purely national phenomenon.69 Nevertheless, this reductio ad unum of the 
theory and practice of federalism is by no means justified: in fact, as Kalypso Nicolaïdis has 
noticed, ‘the ‘federal’ emerged prior to or in contrast with the ‘state’, before the two 
converged.’70 From an historical perspective, federalism constituted a common instrument 
to organize public authority before the rise of the territorial state.71 It seems therefore time 
‘to recuperate insights from the federal vision while freeing it […] from the statist 
paradigm.’72 
                                                 
63 Alfred Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model (1999) 10 J of Democracy 19.  
64 Bruce Ackerman, ‘The Rise of World Constitutionalism’ (1997) 83 Virginia L Rev 771, 776 (arguing that 
‘the (uncertain) transformation of a treaty into a constitution, [which] is at the center of the European Union 
today […] was at the center of the American experience between the Revolution and the Civil War.’). 
65 Daniel Elazar, Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Confederal Arrangements (Rowman 
& Littlefield 1998) 3. 
66 Jean Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy and Constitutionalism (CUP 2012) 
83. 
67 Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, ‘Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law’ 
(2009) 122 Harvard L Rev 1791. 
68 Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (OUP 2009) 
22. 
69 See for a discussion in the EU context, Tim Koopmans, ‘Federalism: the Wrong Debate’ (1992) 29 CMLR  
1047 
70 Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘Conclusion: The Federal Vision Beyond the Federal State’ in Kalypso Nicolaïdis and 
Robert Howse (eds), The Federal Vision (OUP 2001) 441. 
71 Elazar (n 58) 115. 
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Before the dawn of the Wesphalian era, federalism was the predominant constitutional 
theory and instrument of governance for compound systems that were not states. As a 
plurality of examples from modern history reveals – from the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands to the Swiss Confederation, from the Hanseatic League to the Holy Roman 
Empire and later the German Bund – federalism was a widely used institutional mechanism 
to organize public authority in ways which was compatible with the self-rule of the 
federated entities while permitting shared-rule by the confederate body in its collective 
capacity.73 These experiments – which were supported by the theorization of legal scholars 
such as Johannes Althusius, Hugo Grotius or Samuel Pufendorf, among others – attempted 
to consociate pre-existing political units through a foedus (in Latin: a pact) for the 
achievement of specific purposes, such as security, welfare or trade.74 As such, federalism 
was conceived as ‘a species of international law’75 – an intermediate form of regulation 
between the ius civitatis (domestic law) and the ius gentium (in modern parlance: 
international law). 
 
The most sophisticated constitutional experiment in federal governance was achieved in 
America where the Articles of Confederations of 1781 and the Federal Constitution of 1787 
designed a regime which – in the celebrated words of James Madison in the Federalist Papers 
No. 39 – was ‘in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition 
of both.’76 Although the adoption of the Constitution of the United States (US) is 
retrospectively identified as the date of birth of the federal state model, and as the 
conventional watershed between (ancient) confederalism and (modern) federalism, a 
contextual analysis shows that ‘the principal difference between the Constitution of 1787 
and the Article of Confederation was one of means rather than ends.’77 As it has been 
highlighted, because in the English language of the 18th and early 19th century, 
‘confederation and federation were used as synonyms,’78 the US Constitution continued to 
partake of the mixed (con)federal nature of its predecessor, as a system laying in between 
domestic law and international law.79 Indeed, ‘[t]he new American republic was in this 
sense a hybrid system of governance that combined international with national modes of 
governance.’80 
 
As Peter Onuf and Nicholas Onuf have underlined, the founders of the American 
(con)federation drew on a long tradition of political thought and practice and sought to 
create in the context of the US a union which would abide simultaneously by republican 
principles in the domestic affairs of each of the states and by Enlightenment principles of 
international relations among the states.81 In doing so, they largely set aside ‘the problem of 
                                                 
73 See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty: The European Union in Comparative Context 
(Johns Hopkins University Press 2001) and Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political 
Perspective (CUP 2009). 
74 See Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman (eds), Theories of Federalism: A Reader (Palgrave 2005) and Heinz 
Eulau, ‘Theories of Federalism under the Holy Roman Empire’ (1941) 35 American Political Science Rev 643. 
75 Elazar (n 58) 141. 
76 The Federalis Papers, No. 39 (James Madison) (1787) [see Karmis & Norman, supra note 74, 129]. 
77 Elazar (n 65) 75. 
78 Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman, ‘The Revival of Federalism in Normative Political Theory’ in 
Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman (eds), Theories of Federalism: A Reader (Palgrave 2005) 6. 
79 Schütze (n 68) 22. 
80 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The 
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81 Peter Onuf and Nicholas Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World. The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 
1776-1814 (Madison House 1993). 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 2 
 
19 
 
sovereignty, which so beleaguers the world today.’82 As a reading of the Federalist Papers 
confirms,  
 
[i]n creating a ‘compound republic’ the founders revived the view that political associations 
occupy positions in a framework of ascending levels, none of which can claim the ultimate, 
unlimited sovereign authority. The union obtained powers suiting the needs of a state 
without eliminating the republics composing it or drastically changing their character. 
Ignoring the early modern political discourse that Bodin precipitated, the founders invoked 
Montesquieu to call their creation a federal republic, as if it were conceptually 
indistinguishable from a mere confederation of sovereign states.83 
 
Despite this origin, the subsequent evolution of the US – especially after the Civil War – 
has produced a profound redefinition of the US constitutional system of governance,84 and 
today the US is certainly an example of a federal state (although important remnants of the 
federal founding pervade the current regime).85 Arguably, an important pressure for the US 
to overcome its (con)federal organization was produced during the 19th century by the 
practice of international relations dominated by European states and grounded on the 
Westphalian theory of international law. As Hendrik Spruyt has explained, the emergence 
of the sovereign states increasingly undermined the viability of competitive forms of 
political organization which lacked analogous means of internal hierarchy and 
enforcement.86 As a result, while federal systems consolidated into sovereign federal states, 
federalism ‘has been relegated to the dustbin of history and deemed an anachronism ever 
since the system of sovereign states triumphed in Europe.’87 
 
Nevertheless, the transformations occurring today at the regional and global scale, have 
signaled a possible revival of the (con)federal idea. As it has been stated, ‘[t]he world as a 
whole is in the midst of a paradigm shift from a world of states, modeled after the ideal of 
the nation-state developed at the beginning of the modern epoch in the [17th] century, to a 
world of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages of a 
constitutionalized federal character.’88 Hence, the study of the contemporary rise of 
constitutional regimes beyond the states could benefit from the conceptual instruments 
offered by the theory and practice of federalism – i.e. of compound constitutional regimes 
which are different from federal states. A comparative and historical perspective, in other 
words, can shed new light on the challenges that the international system is currently 
experiencing, since, as Daniel Halberstam has argued, federalism can ‘lay the foundations 
for understanding the constitutional significance of arrangements among multiple levels of 
authority,’ from local institutions all the way up to global governance regimes.89 
 
5. THE FEDERAL FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS BEYOND THE 
STATES 
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Re-conceptualizing the rise of constitutional regimes at the regional and global level 
through the prism of federalism does not only satisfy a desire for definitions.90 Adopting a 
federalist approach to the study of transnational governance may help to navigate the 
‘mystery of global governance’91 and identify a number of recurrent features which 
characterize the structure, functioning and finality of constitutional systems beyond the 
states. A number of scholars have attempted to identify several core principles of 
transnational constitutional regimes, but this endeavor has been carried out from a 
normative, top-down perspective, aimed also at shaping the development of global 
governance de lege ferenda.92 This Section, instead, adopts a bottom-up approach and seeks 
to identify several recurrent features of transnational constitutional regimes in light of the 
comparative analysis of historical experience of federal governance undertaken above. The 
interest here is not to indicate by what principles transnational governance institutions 
should abide, but rather to emphasize how many of their current features reflect long-
standing elements of federalism’s practice and theory. As I shall try to point out, the 
features of contemporary regional and global governance regimes represent a break with 
the statist model of constitutional authority. However, when seen from an historical and 
comparative perspective, they correspond to those of federal experiments and theorization 
of the past. 
 
Needless to say, because systems of public authority beyond the states currently come under 
a variety of forms, the attempt to compare them and to identify several recurrent features is 
not an easy task. Certainly, it would require much more consideration than what is 
permitted in the format of a short essay. In what follows, therefore, I will only try to sketch 
the contours of what are some recurrent features of regional and global governance 
institutions, in the hope to trace the path for a future research agenda. In my view, in 
particular, it is possible to recognize in constitutional regimes beyond the states, and to 
reconnect to the theory of federalism, three features – a structural, a functional and a 
purposive one. Synthetically, I label these features pluralism, subsidiarity and liberty. I will try 
to say a few words on each. 
 
5.1 Pluralism 
 
A first feature that permeates the structure of transnational constitutional regimes is, in my 
view, that of pluralism. All the organizations that recently emerged at the regional and 
world-wide level are characterized by a fragmentation and dispersion of powers. As was 
explained in Section 2, all global governance institutions are endowed with some powers of 
decision-making or adjudication. Yet, these powers are not unlimited but rather coexist 
with, and are counterbalanced by, the powers of the constituting member states, which 
continue to retain crucial competences. Moreover, within the internal structure of global 
governance institutions, powers are often distributed between a plurality of bodies and 
entities, which exercise different functions and tasks, and which enjoy different forms of 
legitimacy. As a result, the structure of constitutional regimes beyond the states reveals the 
lack of a single, supreme locus of authority, capable of taking an ultimate decision. Rather, 
these regimes follow a logic of pluralism, in which power is dispersed along vertical and 
horizontal axes. Resorting to the terminology developed by Daniel Halberstam, it is 
                                                 
90 See Elazar (n 65) 12 (noticing ironically that if something ‘looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks 
like a duck, it is highly likely to be a duck.’). 
91 See David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman (eds), 
Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 37. 
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possible to say that transnational constitutional regimes are heterarchical systems, rather 
than hierarchical ones.93 
 
Pluralism is a defining feature of the EU system of governance in which power is divided 
between the member states and the EU, as well as between a plurality of institutions within 
the EU itself. In fact, a new scholarly movement which named itself ‘constitutional 
pluralism’ has recently seen its birth in Europe.94 As Miguel Maduro has argued, 
constitutional pluralism seeks to empirically explain ‘the phenomenon of plurality of 
constitutional sources and claims of final authority which create a context for potential 
constitutional conflicts which are not hierarchically regulated,’95 and to normatively justify 
its existence as the best fit for the EU.96 At the same time, pluralism also shapes the 
structure of human rights regimes.97 In the context of the ECHR, for instance, pluralism 
explains the complex dialogue between the ECtHR and the member states that are parties 
to the ECHR, as well as their supreme and constitutional courts. Moreover strong pluralist 
features are evident in global and regional trade organizations or in the context of the UN: 
albeit the hegemonic tendencies of the UNSC have not gone unnoticed, the UN Charter 
designs a bulk of horizontal separation of powers between multiple bodies, which adds upon 
the vertical separation of powers between the UN and its member states.98 
 
While the pluralism of regional and global constitutional regimes may seem 
groundbreaking from a statist perspective, this is really nothing new from the point of view 
of federalism.99 Contrary to the Westphalian system – in which authority is hierarchically 
organized, with a clear sovereign body entitled to speak the last world – in federal systems 
there is no ultimate power-center, but rather a plurality of institutions sharing power.100 As 
has been underlined, indeed, ‘pluralism provides the conceptual background to all modern 
federal thought’101 and ‘federalism emphasizes constitutionalized pluralism and power 
sharing as the basis of a truly democratic government.’102 Pluralism was a distinctive 
feature of confederal unions in modern Europe.103 And famously, James Madison defined the 
US constitutional system as a pluralist regime when he stated, in Federalist Papers No. 51, 
that ‘[i]n the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first 
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided 
among distinct and separate departments.’104 This feature, of course, surprised Alexis de 
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Tocqueville, when he described the US as a regime of ‘divided sovereignty’105 – a definition 
that has made its way up to contemporary jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court.106 
Almost two hundred years after Tocqueville’s visit to America, we should be less surprised 
to see pluralism as a defining principle of constitutional regimes beyond the states.107 
 
5.2 Subsidiarity 
 
A second, functional feature which seems to be germane to constitutional regimes beyond 
the states is that of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity serves as a criterion for the exercise of 
competences in pluralist regimes in which there are multiple and overlapping layers of 
decision-making authorities. Because, as was previously underlined, regional and global 
governance institutions add upon the states, but do not replace them, all these regimes are 
characterized by overlapping levels or units of government. As a result, they all face the 
question of when should powers be exercised by a higher level of government rather than 
by a lower one, or (to avoid the hierarchical connotations of the terminology of ‘levels’) 
when they should be exercised by the authority with the broader jurisdictional reach rather 
than by one with a narrower scope. Subsidiarity answers this question by requiring that 
decisions be taken by default at the lower unit of government unless when this unit is 
unable to achieve the objective for which action is sought and, at the same time, a higher 
unit is better able to do so. Hence, subsidiarity ‘regulates how to allocate or use authority 
within a political or legal order […] that disperse[s] authority between a center and 
various member units […holding] that the burden or arguments lies with attempts to 
centralize authority.’108 
 
In the framework of the EU, subsidiarity has acquired the status of a written principle of 
constitutional law since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.109 In its current version, Article 5 of 
the EU Treaty proclaims that in areas of shared competences between the EU and the 
member states, ‘the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level.’ Subsidiarity is also a crucial facet of human rights 
regimes world-wide.110 In the ECHR context, for instance, subsidiarity is both reflected in 
the treaty procedural requirement that plaintiffs exhaust domestic remedies before 
appealing to the ECtHR, as well as in the jurisprudential doctrine that recognizes a margin 
of appreciation to the contracting parties in their interpretation of the ECHR whenever a 
transnational consensus on a given fundamental right is (still) lacking. The principle of 
complementarity codified in Article 17 of the ICC Statute, then, is consistent with 
subsidiarity, as prosecutions will only be commenced at the international level if states are 
unwilling or unable to carry them out at the domestic level. Finally, subsidiarity arguably 
shapes the function of the UN: pursuant to the UN Charter, in fact, the UNSC is empowered 
to act only when threats to peace or security reach a critical threshold, which implies that 
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action should be left to other actors when the stability of the international community as a 
whole is not jeopardized. 
 
Seen in this vein, subsidiarity as it has emerged in regional and global constitutional 
regimes relates to a long-standing feature of federalism. Despite Daniel Elazar’s criticism of 
the theological origins of the principle of subsidiarity – with its rooting in Catholic 
(hierarchical) theology, rather than in the Jewish and Protestant tradition of (heterarchical) 
covenants between men and God111 – Daniel Halberstam has convincingly explained that 
‘the key theoretical concept underlying a general theory of federalism is what Europeans 
call ‘subsidiarity’.’112 Subsidiarity crucially explains how confederal unions first came about 
in modern Europe: the Swiss Confederation, eg, was established as a subsidiary 
organization, mainly for self-defense purposes, which left to the cantons all matters that did 
not require trans-cantonal coordination.113 Subsidiarity still shape today the architecture of 
Swiss federalism, as for instance it provides one of the grounds for appeals to the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal on constitutional matters.114 At the same time, even though the 
Constitutional Convention that drafted the US Constitution did not codify an explicit 
principle of subsidiarity,115 the logic of subsidiarity heavily shapes the attribution of 
legislative competences to the US Congress in Article I, § 8 by assigning ‘power to the 
smallest unit of government that internalizes the effects of its exercise.’116 Equally, in a 
global world, problems of externalities and collective action require that functions be 
assigned to the authorities that are better positioned to handle them, and subsidiarity works 
as the principle to achieve this result. 
 
5.3 Liberty 
 
Whereas pluralism and subsidiarity represents recurrent structural and functional features 
of constitutional regimes beyond the states, I would like to suggest that a third, purposive 
feature can be detected in many new transnational arrangements emerging at the regional 
and world-wide stage. I would submit that this feature is connected to the enhancement of 
liberty. Put bluntly: I am fully aware of the cumbersome connotations that a term such as 
liberty conveys. So I want to make clear that, in my view, this feature is certainly revealing 
itself nowadays only in asymmetrical and multifaceted ways in the various regional and 
global constitutional regimes. Whereas pluralism and subsidiarity seem to be widespread 
features of transnational constitutional regimes, the enhancement of liberty is a property 
not visible in all of them. Yet, with these caveats, I would tentatively say that the 
enhancement of liberty is a recurrent finality accustoming many transnational regimes 
emerging beyond the states. Crucially, liberty here should be intended as a form of ‘federal 
liberty’117 – that is as a liberty that individuals, as free and autonomous agents, exercise 
within the bounds of the constitutional system, and subject to the counter-veiling pressures 
that are brought about by demands for self-governance.  
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The trend toward the enhancement of liberty is quite straightforward in human rights 
regimes, or in the framework of the ICC, whose finality are precisely to protect fundamental 
rights and the liberty of men and women to decide how to lead a decent life. An analogous 
phenomenon, at the same time, seems to characterize regional or global economic 
organizations whose main purpose is to reduce barriers to trade, thus enlarging the space 
for the exercise of economic rights and free market initiative. While international economic 
law is not necessarily framed as mechanisms to enhance liberty, certainly its effect is to 
empower economic actors to exercise their freedom of enterprise through a larger 
geographical arena. In a more complex way, then, I would posit that also processes of 
regional political integration such as those epitomized by the EU contribute to strengthen 
liberty and human agency – not only because of the external constraints that the EU places 
on human rights restrictions by the states, but also because of the opportunities that the EU 
offers to its citizens to autonomously decide about their destiny through new forms of 
supranational representation.118  
 
Yet, as I acknowledged above, relevant counter-examples exist. The most prominent one 
may be represented by the action of the UNSC which, in the context of the struggle against 
terrorism, has developed an invasive architecture of sanctions, profoundly challenging the 
protection of liberties and rights across the globe.119 The global counter-terrorism regime 
established by the UNSC proved so detrimental to fundamental rights that even courts with 
a tradition of deference vis-à-vis the UN felt compelled to side-step UN obligations in order 
to reaffirm the protection of fundamental rights and liberties protected within their 
(transnational) legal orders.120 Nevertheless, protection of liberties and human rights do 
actually feature as one of the main purposes of the UN – being enshrined in Article 1(3) of 
the UN Charter, as a cornerstone of the new world order to be built on the ashes of World 
World II.121 Increasing calls, therefore, have been made for the UNSC to return to the spirit 
and the letter of the UN Charter and put aside a regime that has threatened fundamental 
liberties world-wide.122 Although it is too early to say whether these calls for greater due 
process and procedural justice will contribute to change the practice of the UNSC, the fact 
remains that the value of liberty under the UN Charter has so far remained under-enforced. 
 
Bearing this important caveat in mind, I would like to emphasize that the finality to enhance 
liberty that currently emerges in many transnational constitutional arrangements 
corresponds to a constitutive feature of federal regimes of the past. To make this point, it 
may be helpful to recall the theoretical justification of federal regimes and to compare it 
with the justification advanced to legitimize the creation of the sovereign state. The idea 
that the preservation of liberty is the main finality of federalism as a form of political 
organization is well reflected in the work of Montesquieu: while, pursuant to the language 
of his time, Montesquieu couched the liberty purpose of federal systems under the notion of 
                                                 
118 For an assessment of civil, political and social rights in the EU, in comparative perspectives with the US see 
Federico Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights in Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative Perspective 
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creation of the UN, as epitomized by the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
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republicanism,123 he clearly emphasized that the creation of a ‘society of societies’ was 
instrumental to withstand foreign force while avoiding internal despotism – and thus 
ensuring a space for freedom and self-governance.124 This view contrasts with the teleology 
at the origins of the Westphalian state, at least as epitomized in the paradigmatic work of 
Thomas Hobbes: As The Leviathan made clear,125 the creation of the state was not 
concerned with the preservation of liberty, but rather pursued the end of security, and 
therefore required the citizenry to renounce every right, except the right to life, for the 
greater purpose of securing the stability and peace of the res publica.126 
 
Of course, theoretical disquisitions about the teleological origins of federalism and statism 
do not necessarily reflect the historical reality of the formation of territorial public authority 
both in the form of the state and union of states.127 Yet, it is noteworthy that the American 
Founders proclaimed that securing the blessing of liberty was the key finality of the act of 
union and designed a system in which multiple separations of powers would prevent 
government overreaching and preserve freedom.128 The US federal experience, otherwise, 
also shows the manifold dimensions of the idea of liberty, with its alternative meanings of 
both ‘communal liberty’ (the liberty of the communities to govern themselves freely) and 
‘individual liberty’ (the liberty of the individuals to act as a free agents regardless of 
community constraints).129 Reconciling these two dimensions of liberty has been a hard 
challenge in any federal regime and, although in the US experience the latter has step by 
step took over the former, a comparative analysis reveals a more uneven picture.130 
Whatever the ultimate meaning of liberty, though, the point that I am trying to make here 
is that the difficult search for a way to maximize liberty is a fil rouge that runs from the early 
experience of federal governance to many modern experiments of global constitutionalism. 
Whether this pattern will consolidate in the context of global governance remains a 
fascinating question worth further exploration.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The transformations of the global legal arena have increasingly attracted the attention of 
lawyers, and constitutionalism is now regarded as the lingua franca to be spoken in the 
transnational agorà. This essay suggested that comparative law, especially the theory and 
practice of federalism (as distinct from the federal state), can provide a useful prism through 
which to enrich our understanding of the phenomena occurring at the global stage. While 
the debate about the constitutionalization of international law has divided scholarship, this 
essay explained that the rise of transnational forms of governance is not novel, but rather 
finds enlightening precedents in experience and theorizations of federalism. Sketching the 
outline for future research, the essay has attempted to draw insights from a comparative, 
historical analysis of federalism and to identify three general features that characterize 
constitutional regimes beyond the states. Tentatively: pluralism, subsidiarity and liberty 
have been branded as recurrent features of the structure, functioning and purpose of new 
                                                 
123 See Phillip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (OUP 1997). 
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transnational regimes (from the EU to the ECHR, the UN and the WTO). While much 
research remains to be done, federalism seems to offer a new, yet old, perspective to the 
study of an ever more integrated global legal world.  
